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OSBORN v. OS!BORN Cal 333. 
42 Cal.2d 358 Cite as 267 P.2d 333 
OSBORN Y. OSBORN.I aL certain property provided for holding of 
L. A. 22540. title by father until his death, and vesting. 
Supreme Court of California. 
In Bank. 
March 1, 19'"'04. 
Rehearing Denied ·March 25, 1954. 
Suit to quiet title. The Superior Court, 
,Los Angeles 'County, Ben V. -Curler, J" 
. entered' judgment from which the plaintiff 
appealed. The Supreme Court, Traynor, J., 
held that where -compromise settlement of 
dispute between father and son as to title 
to certain property provided for holding of 
title by father until his death, and vesting 
in son upon father's demise, and father was 
required to deliver deed of such tenor to 
escrow holder, father received, his consid-
eration for the deed when the compromise 
settlement was executed, and there were no 
·-conditions precedent to vesting of legal title 
in remainder 'in son, but such ,title passed, 
if there was' a valid delivery, at t'ime of de-
posit of deed, even -though deed was to be 
retained by holder until father's death. 
J udgmen,t reyersed. 
Carter, J., dissented in part and Schau-
er, J., dissented. 
Prior·opinion, 256 P.2d 653. 
t. Deeds.~132, 141 
The deposit of a deed granting an es-
tate in fee simple, with instructions that it 
be transmitted to the grantee -upon the 
death of the grantor, conveys a remainder 
interest 'in fee simple with a life estate- re-
served in' the grantor, if the grantor in-
tended the deposit to be irrevocable. 
2. Escrows ~12 
Where grant'or, as party to binding 
contract for sale of realty with reservation 
of life estate, deposits the deed in escrow, 
the legal title passes to the grantee at the 
time of his completion of the conditions 
precedent, if any, regardless of whether 
'the escrow holder gives grantee physical 
·position of the deed, since grantor's de-
livery in escrow is absolute and cannot 
thereafter be disaffirmed. 
3. Escrows ~t3 
Where compromise settlement or dis-
,pute between father and son as to title to 
in son upon father's demise, and father was 
'l'equired to deliver deed of such tenor to 
escrow holder, father received his consid~ 
eration for the deed when the compromise 
settlement was executed, and there were no 
conditions precedent to vesting of legal title 
in remainder in son, but such title passed, 
if there was a valicl delivery, at time of 
deposit of deed, even though deed was to 
be retained by holder until father's death. 
4. Oeeds ~56(2), 200 
Evidence ~230(2, 3) 
The question of whether a deed was de-
livered is one of intent, and resort may be 
had 'to the acts and declarations of the' 
grantor, both before and after his transmisw 
sion of the deed to the grantee or a third· 
party, for purpose of determining such in-
tent. 
5. Deeds ¢::;;::>66 
Where grantor's only instructions with' 
respect to delivery of a deed are' in' writ-
ing, the effect of the transaction depends; 
upon the true construction of the writing, 
and it is a pure question bf law whether 
there was an absolute delivery of the de~d. 
6. Deeds ¢::;;::>61 
Ag~eement between rather '<l:nd son in! 
settlement of dispute as to title to 'certain' 
property, which required father to deposit' 
in escrow a deed granting, remafnder in-·· 
terest in fee simple to son, and reserving, 
life estate in father, and which expressly' 
instructed escrow holders to resist any at-, 
tempt by either father or son to obtairi,pbs-: 
session of deed prior to demise of father,: 
followed by a delivery of d.(;ed, ip. ac .. , 
cordance therewith, resulted in, an absolute.! 
delivery, notwithsta~ding reservation .in 
father of right to revoke deed in event son 
harmed him or refused to carry oilt terms' 
of the agreement, since right to revoke 
merely limited the future interest created 
to a vested remainder subject to being 
divested uIJon happening of a condition 
subsequent. 
7. Appeal and Error ~878(1) 
The failure to ~ake an appeal demon-. 
strates only satisfacti9n wi!~_ the judg~ent 
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as it is,' and not as it 'is changed by a partial 
reversal. 
8. Appeal and Error <lP878(1), 1172(1) 
Where both that part of judgment re-
fusing to quiet title in plaintiff and that 
portion refusing to quiet title in plaintiff's 
stepmother, who ·purchased at execution 
sale, involved question of whether plaintiff 
had acquired a rema'jnder interest under 
deed deposited in escrow by his fathe'r pur-
suant to agreement settling dispute as to 
ownership of certain property, Supreme 
Court had jurisdiction to review the entire 
Judgment, even though the execution pur-
chaser did not appeal, and it would reverse 
the entire judgment upon determination 
that trial court erred in determining that 
no remainder interest passed. 
Guerin & Guerin and John J. Guerin, Los 
Angeles, for appellant. 
Louis Warren, Los Angeles, for respond-
ents. 
TRAYNOR, Justice. 
PIa:intiff Merinoeth Osborn appeals from 
an adverse judgment on his complaint- to 
quiet title to certain real property in Los 
Angeles County, known as Lot 97 of the 
Casa Verduga Villa Tract. Defendant 
Louise Osborn, - plaintiff's stepmother, an-
swered and cross-complained to have title 
to Lot 97 quieted in her. Judgment W~LS 
entered for plaintiff on the cross-complaint, 
and defendant Louise Osborn has not ap-
pealed therefrom. The other defendants 
named' in the complaint disclaim any in-
terest in the property. 
Lot 97 was originally acquired by Meri-
noeth's mother Chloie Osborn, in 1922. 
Chloie died intestate leaving her husband, 
Thomas D. Osborn, and their son, Meri-
noeth, surviving. On June 27, 1939, during 
the administration of ChIoie's estate, Meri-
noeth and Thomas executed a "Stipulation", 
subsequently approved by the court, to re-
solve their conflicting claims to ChIoie's es-
tate. The material part of this stipulation 
follows: . "It is further' stipulated and 
agreed by and between the parties hereto 
that upon execution of:the' within Stipula-
tion that Thomas D.Osborn will execute 
either by deed contract or declaration of 
trust sufficient documents, convey~ces or 
declarations so that the property known as 
Lot 97, Casa Verduga Villa Tract, etc., will 
be retained in the name of Thomas D. Os-
born, during his lifetime and that the same 
should vest in his son 11erinoeth R. Osborn 
at the time of the demise of the said Thom-
as D. Osborn." After the execution of the 
stipulation, the probate court distributed Lot 
97 to Thomas. 
On July 7, 1939, pursuant to the stip-
ulation, Thomas and Merinoeth executed a 
trust agreement, and Thomas executed a 
deed "in accordance with the terms and con-
ditions of that certain trust agreement of 
July 7th, 1939, * * * and * * • 
subject to all conditions, exceptions and 
reservations as in said trust agreement 
provided." (Italics added.) The deed 
granted Lot 97 to Merinoeth subject to a 
life estate in Thomas. The trust agreement 
provided that the deed to Lot 97 "shall be 
turned over and delivered to the Trustees 
to hold and keep possession of said (ie'ed, 
not to record the same during the lifetime 
of" Thomas. The trustees were instructed 
to "turn over and deliver" the deed to Meri~ 
noeth on the death of Thomas. It was re-
cited in the trust agreement that Thomas 
reserved a life estate in the property, and 
that he also reserved "the right to revoke 
the deed in the event [Merinoeth] wilfully 
harms [Thomas], and [Merinoeth] reserves 
the right to cancel this agreement if [Thom-
as] wilfully harms" him. (Italics added.) 
Other material parts of the trust agreement 
are: "The parties hereto further agree that 
in the event any attempt is 1nade by either 
party hereto to break the terms of the with-
in trust agreement, or to force the trustees 
to surrender the within described deed prior 
to the demise of [Thomas] by court action,. 
or other proceedings, then, in that event, 
the party attempting to break the tenns of 
the within trust agreement, shall pay in ad-
dition to expenses and court costs, a rea-
sonab~e attorney's fee to the said trustees. 
The parties hereto- further authoro:ze and 
instruct the trustees herein mentioned It) 
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defend any attempts made by either parties Thomas and deposited with Warner and 
hereto to break the terms of the within trust Franklin. Since Merinoeth had acquired 
agreement, or to force the trustees to sur- no interest, the court concluded that Louise 
render the within described deed. * * * acquired none by reason of the execution 
The wilfull failure or refusal on the party sale. 
[sic] of either party hereto to carry out the Plaintiff's basic contention on this ap-
terms and conditions of the within trust peal is bhat the trial court erred in holding 
agreement, or the wilfull refusal or failure that he acquired no interest in Lot 97 under 
of either party to comply with the obliga- the deed executed by Thomas and deposited 
tions herein provided, on his part to be with Warner and Franklin to be transmit-
performed, shall permit either party to re- ted to him on the death of Thomas. Plain-
scind this agreement and shall. confer upon tiff contends that the deposit with Warner 
the grantor the right to cancel the within and Franklin constituted a valid delivery 
mentioned deed and this agreement by a immediately vesting in him- a remainder 
declaration duly executed and recorded with interest in the property. The first issue to 
the formality of a deed and a thirty day be resolved, therefore, is the validity and 
written notice thereof served on the gran- effect of the deed executed by Thomas. 
tee, or his attorney." (Italics added.) The 
deed was deposited with defendants Frank-
lin and Warner, who were named as trus-
tees in the trust agreement. 
Merinoeth had become indebted to War-
ner for legal services in the probate of 
Chloie's estate and the preparation of the 
trust agreement. In 1941, Warner resigned 
as trustee and assigned his claim against 
Merinoeth to his secretary, Champion, who 
recovered judgment thereon. Execution 
was levied on Merinoeth's interest in Lot 
97, and the property was sold in 1942 to 
Champion for $336.37. Thereafter, at the 
request of Thomas, Champion transferred 
the certificate of sale to Louise Osborn for 
$415. Although Louise contends that Mer-
inoeth had notice of these proceedings, he 
made no appearance and disclaims any 
knowledge of them. 
In anticipation of a sale of Merinoeth's 
interest in Lot 97 to Thomas, an agreement 
purporting to cancel the trust agreement 
was executed on January 14, 1946 and then 
cancelled in March 1946. Thomas died in-
testate on December 31, 1946, leaving his 
second wife, Louise, and Merinoeth sur-
viving. Merinoeth's subsequent demand up-
on the trustees for the deed executed by 
Thomas was refused. 
In refusing to quiet title in either Mer-
-inoeth or Louise, the trial court concluded 
that Merinoeth had not acquired any in-
terest in Lot 97 under the deed executed by 
[1,2] It has long been established in 
this state that the deposit of a deed grant-
ing an estate in fee simple, with instruc-
tions that it be transmitted to the grantee 
upon the death of the grantor, conveys a 
remainder interest in fee simple with a life 
estate reserved in the grantor, if uhe gran-
tor intended the deposit to be irrevocable. 
Bury v. Young, 98 Cal. 446, 451-452, 33 P. 
338; Hunt v. Wicht, 174 Cal. 205, 206-208, 
162 P. 639, L.R.A.1917C, 961; Wilkerson v. 
Seib, 20 Cal.2d 556, 560, 127 P.2d 904. The 
result is the same as if the grantor deliv-
ered to the grantee a deed reserving a .life 
estate and granting a remainder in fee. 
The same result is also ac.complished by the 
deposit of a deed in escrow pursuant to a 
binding contract of sale of a remainder and 
the grantee's performance of the conditions 
of the escrow. At the time of the execu-
tion of uhe contract of sale, the grantee ac-
quires an equitable title to the estate :being 
sold.; the :grantor retains the legal title as 
security for the purchase price. The legal 
title passes to the grantee at the time of 
his completion of the conditions precedent, 
whether or not the escrow holder gives him 
physical possession of the deed; the gran-
tor's delivery to the escrow holder is ab-
solute and cannot thereafter be disaffirmed. 
Cannon v. Handley, 72 Cal. 133, 140, 13 P. 
315; McDonald v. Huff, 77 Cal. 279, 282, 
19 P. 499; Bradbury v. Davenport, 120 
Cal. 152, 154, 52 P. 301; see, also, Hagge 
v. Drew, 27 Cal.2d 368, 375, 165 P.2d 461. 
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: [3l" In the present case, 'the deed from 
Thomas'to Merinoeth was' executed :pursu-" 
ant' to "a binding contract supported by ade~ 
quate' ,consideration. On .the fa'ce of the 
deed, Thomas reserved a life estate and 
granted" a ·remainder to Merirtoeth. :When 
Thomas delivered the deed to the trustees, 
there were ·no conditions precedent for 
Metinoeth; to. 'perform. Thomas had re':' 
ceived the ,·conside:ration ·for the grant, 
when the' compromise' settlement of Chloie's' 
estate was executed. The provision that 
the .. trustees ,should hold the deed until: 
Thomas' death was, liot a: condition prece~ 
dent to' the ,passage. of legal tit1e,. for: even' 
fn cases 6f gift,-e. g.,. Bury v. Yotmg, supra, 
an instruction that the depositary is t.o ·re-
tra,in; possession 9f the de~d until, the"death 
of. the gra:t~.t?r: do~s not prevent the'deed. 
fro~ being ~perative as a present corivey:". 
anee. In this cas.e, M.erinoeth was.·,not '<1.. 
donee; he 'was a purchaser: fo~ value, ~l­
r~~dy' 'ves'ted with an equitable title to 'the 
i'erriainder •... The ~ituation is thus ~nalogous 
to:. that of a t'rue escrow after thd purchas': 
er has perf~rmed all O,f the condidori~ 'pr~G:" 
edent' .. " Performance' Qf those coriditio"ns 
aut6matkally ves'ts ."'the legal "titl~ in, hin{ 
e~e'n thb·ugh \4eescrow holder reiains pos-
~essiori, of ill;; .d.~~d.' .., ... .. .. ., 
.' [4-6] ·Defe·rtdanf contends, . however, 
that Thomas did not:make a legal delivery 
of -the: deed. Delivery is a question of in-
tent: . In some caseS to as'certain 'the' 'gran-
tor's intent it is'.necessarY to have' recours'e 
to his acts and dec:Iarations both before and 
after his··transmission· cit" the deed to the 
grantee or a third party. Williams v. Kidd, 
170 Cal. 631, 649-652, 151 P. 1; Rice v. 
Carey, 170 Cal. 748; 75:J.c754, ·151 p, 135; 
Donahue v, Sweeney, 171 Cal. 388,: 391-392, 
153 P. 708; Northern Cal. Conference 
Ass'n, etc., v. Smith, 209 Cal. 26, 33, 285P, 
314. When,: as here, however, the' gran-
tor's Hanly :instructions are in writing~ the' 
effect of the"transaction depends upon' the 
true' construction of the' writing. . It is, in 
other words~ a: pure questioh of law wheth-
er there ·was an .absolute delivery· or not.". 
Moore V,. Trott, 156 CaL 353, 357, 104 P. 
578, 580. Thomas executed the deed and 
delivered. it .-to ,the trustees 'pursuant to the' 
provisipns o·f. the ·frust ·agreement. ' It was, 
a completed ad. and nothing. r>emaine"d\ to· be 
done to vest the legal title to the remainder 
in Merinoeth. Thomas' was bound by the. 
terms orthe trust agreement,: executed con ... 
temporaneously with the deed, 'riot" to at.:.· 
tempt to r'ecall the deed· from' the posses~ 
sion' of the trustees.- The trustees, were spe4 
cifically instructed to resist any attempt by 
either Thomas or Me'riri.6eth to .. obtain pos-. 
session of the deed prior' to the demise of 
Thomas, and' were futther il)str.ucted to 
hold the deed for the benefit of Merinoeth. 
Even if it had been contended that Mer-
inoeth had harmed Thomas o~ failed to car-, 
ry'but the tenus pfthe trust agreement and 
Thomas had wished to assert his right -to 
revoke, he 'could 'not redill the deed;· 'he had 
to exe'cute arid ,record a' declaration 'of revo·;'" 
cation with. the formality of a deed, after 
giving thirty d~ys' notice thereof :to .. Mer, 
inoeth,yllO might then defeat the proposed 
revocation hy showing that ther'e was no 
,;,iolation of the ti-'ust agreement. . . 
It is c1ear,therefore, that Thomas did not 
retain control ove.r the deed after he d~liv~ 
ered it to the trustees. There is nothing in 
the trust. agreement, or external: to. it, . to 
indicate, that' Thom~s did not intend the 
trans~is'sjon' of the deed to the. trustees t~ 
be a valid legal delivery, Indeed, the whole 
tenor 'of the stipulation and the trust agree-
ment . .is that Thomas 'intended to grant 
Merinoeth a pre~ently vested remainder in-
tere$t. In the stipulation· of June 27th, 
Thomas promised . that 'Iupon execution of 
the within Stipulation" he would execute 
the documents necessary to transfer a re-
mainder interest to Merinoeth. The trust-
agreement, contained a number of restric-
tjons .on Thom~s' right to use the prope:~ty 
during his lifetime. If Merinoeth 'was not 
to have' a 'presently . vested remainder in-
terest, these provisions were superfluous.· 
Fur~hermore, Thomas' conduct aftd' the 
execution and delivery. of the deed, 'in re':' 
questing Champion to' sell the certificate 
frorri the" execiltion sale and, in negotiating 
with Merinoeth in 1946 (after the exeeu-· 
tion sale)' for. the 'purchase 'of his interest in 
t\le ·pr.operty .for $3,500, 'is corroborative of 
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I: TJiomas' 'intent as ~evealed in 
·ments. 
the docu- ri,ght to' reVOKe was, therefore, a right· to 
Defendant contends, however, that 
: Thomas' reservation of the right to re-
voke the deed, in the ·event that Merinoeth 
harmed him or refused to' carry out the 
terms of the trust agreement, made the 
delivery to the trustees conditional' so that" 
no estate vested in Merinoeth by virtue of 
the deposit of the deed with the trustees. 
This contention cannot be sustained. Thom-
as' right t9 revoke did, not· affect the de-
livery to the trustees, but'merely limited the 
future interest created to a vested re-
mainder subject to being, divested upon the 
happening of a condition subsequent. The 
situation is similar to that in Tennant v. 
John Tennant Memorial Home, 167 Cal. 
570, 140 P. 242, where the grantor re-
served an unqualified right to revoke on the 
face 'of the deed, which" granted a remain-
der in fee to vest in possession at the ter-
mination of the "grantor's life estate. It" 
was there held that the grantee acquired a 
remain"der subject to a condition subse-
quent,' and that "the power to revoke did 
not operate to destroy, or in anywise re-, 
strict the effect of the· deed as a present 
cOJ,lvey'ance of a future vested interest." 
167 Cal. 570, 578, 140 P. 242, 246; see, 
also, . Gray v. Union Trust CO~, 171 Cal. 
,637, 642-643, 154P. 306; Scott, The Law 
. of Trusts, 1939, Vol. I, § 57.1. These cases 
are distinguishable from those on which 
; defendant relies to sustain her contention 
, that the grantor's reservation' of a right to 
I revoke renders the delivery conditional. I See Kenney v. Parks, 125 Cal. 146, 15(}" 
,lSI, 57 P. 772; M.oore v. Trott, 156 Cal. 
1
353, 357, 104 P. 578; Long v. Ryan, 166 
Cal. 442, 445, 137 P. 29. The latter i cases were cases of gift, and the court was 
i concerned with the problem of attempted 
Itestamentary disposition without compli-i anCe with the statute of wills. In those 
I cases, the grantors reserved the right to 
I recall their deeds from the depositary. It 
,was found that the respective grantors did 
It' d . no mten any mterest to pass to the gran-
tees when the deeds were given to the de-
positary, but only intended an interest to 
pass at the time of their death. The 
a67 P,2d-22 
recall the deed, and attached to the de-
livery and not to the interest granted. 
In the present case, the deed was executed 
and delivered to the trustees, not to accom-
plish any testamentary purpose, but to dis-
charge Thomas' obligation's under the con-
tract he entered into with Merinoeth to 
cOI~promise their conflicting claims to 
Chloic's estate. This contract vested Mer-
inoeth with an equitable title to the re-
mainder, since he had a specifically en-
forceable right to have Thomas convey 
the legal title. The legal title was con- . 
vcyed when the deed was delivered to the 
trustees under a binding contract that made 
the delivery irrevocable. Cannon v. Hand-
ley, supra; McDonald v. Huff, supra; 
Pothast v. Kind, 218 Cal. 192, 195, 24 P.2d 
771; see also, Brunoni v. Brunoni, 93 Cal. 
App.2d 215, 219, 208 P.2d 1028. Although 
Thomas could have accomplished the same 
result by delivering a deed to Merinoeth 
with the same reservations as those set 
forth in the trust agreement, see Tennant 
v. John Tennant Memorial Home, supra-
just as in the cases like Bury v~ Young, 
supra, the same result could be accom-
plished by delivery to the grantee of a deed' 
granting a remainder interest-the effect of 
the transaction is the same:. Merinoeth ac-
quired a vested remainder subject to divest-
ment should he breach th\! terms of the 
trust agreement. 
The only question remaining is the or-
der that should now be made by this Court~ 
Merinoeth contends that the part of the 
judgment refusing to quiet title in him 
should be reversed with directions to en-
ter a judgment quieting his title to the 
property and that the part of the judgment 
refusing to quiet title in Louise should be 
affirmed because she di'd not appeal. This 
contention cannot be sustained. 
[7] The trial court determined that 
Merinoeth did not obtain an interest under 
the deed and therefore refused to quiet 
title either in him or in Louise. If Mer-
inoeth did not acquire a remainder in-
terest, Louise could acquire nothing by the 
execution sale. Apparently in the belief 
that as a result of the Judgment each party 
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would get half the property as an heir of 
Thomas, Louise did not appeal. Merinoeth 
appealed, contending that he acquired a re~ 
mainder interest under the deed, that the 
execution sale did not pass any interest to 
Louise, and that he was therefore entitled 
to the property. Had Louise appealed, her 
position could only be that Merinoeth ac-
quired a remainder interest and that the 
execution sale was effective. That conten-
tion, however, would concede the first half 
of Merinoeth's proof-that he acquired a 
remainder interest-a concession fatal to 
a claim that she was entitled to half the 
property as an heir of Thomas. She was 
apparently willing to let the judgment 
stand and take half an interest as heir 
rather than risk an adverse ruling with 
respect to the execution sale, which would 
leave her with nothing. "[T]he failure to 
take an appeal demonstrates only satisfac-
tion with the judgment as is, not as 
changed by a partial revers'at. One may 
elect to stand upon a judgment which, he 
believes, although largely in his favor, does 
not give him all of the bene'fits to which 
he is entitled. To avoid the time and ex-
pense of further litigation, he may be 
persuaded to permit the unfavorable por-
tions to stand in reliance upon the benefits 
received in the other parts." American 
Enterprise, Inc. 'v. Van Winkle, 39 Cal.2d 
210, 221, 246 P.2d 935, 940: 
,[8] Both parts of the judgment turned 
on the trial court's construction of the deed 
and agreement. It refused to quiet title, in 
Merinoeth on the ground that he' did not 
acquire an interest by the deed and agree-
ment; it refused to quiet title in Louise 
for the same reason. Since both parts of 
the judgment embrace the identical issue-
did Merinoeth acquire a' remaindkr inter-
est under the deed-we have jurisdiction 
to review the entire judgment. American 
Enterprise, Inc. v. Van Winkle, supra, 39 
Ca1.2d 210, 217, 246 P,2d 935; B1ache v. 
B1ache, 37 Ca1.2d 531, 538, 233 P.2d 547; 
Milo v. Prior, 210 Cal. 569, 571, 292 P. 
647; Whalen v. Smith, 163 Cal. 360, 362, 
125 P. 904. Our decision that a remainder 
interest passed under the deed removes the 
basis of the trial court's decision adverse 
to Louise'and' unless the etltire juagment is 
reversed she will be denied an opportunity 
to establish her cl;:tim that the execution 
sale was valid. A complete reversal is 
therefore appropriate. Blache v. Blache, 
supra; Rediker v. Rediker, 35 Cal.2d 796, 
798, 221 P.2d 1, 20 A.L.R.2d 1152; Estate 
of Murphey, 7 Ca1.2d 712, 717, 62 P.2d 374; 
d. Hamasaki v. Flotho, 39 Ca1.2d 602, 609, 
248 P.2d 910. 
The judgment is reversed. The parties 
are to bear their own costs on appeal. 
GIBSON, C. J., and SHENK, ED-
MONDS, and SPENCE, J]., concur. 
CARTER, Justice (concurring and dis-
senting in part). 
I concur in the reversal of that portion 
of the judgment from which plaintiff ap-
pealed, which reads as follows: "That 
plaintiff take nothing by reason of his 
amended complaint herein and that de-
fendant Louise L. Osborn have judgment 
for costs of court expended in the sum 
of $-' __ ," but I dissent from the hold-
ing of the majority that the judgment 
against defendant· and cross-complainant 
from which no appeal was taken must also 
be reversed. That portion of the judg-
ment reads as follows: "That crOss-com· 
plainant take nothing' by reason of 'her 
cross-complaint herein, and that cross-de-' 
fendant Merinoeth R. Oshorn have judg-
ment for costs of court expended in the 
sum of $--." 
. It is obvious from a reading of the ma-
jority opinion that the two. portions of the 
judgment abo'\\e quoted are separate and 
distinct and that they are in no wise inter-
dependent, or that the portion from which 
plaintiff and cross-defendant has appealed 
is so connected with the remainder, froni' 
which no appeal was taken, that the ap-
peal .from the first part affects the second 
part and involves a consideration of the 
whole judgment. This conclusion is mani-
fest from the face of the majority opinion 
itself where it discusses in detail both the 
facts and the law relating to plaintiff's 
side of the case but only gives a' passing 
reference to the basis upon which defend-
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ant and cross-complainant. claims title to lien. .It is elementary that an appeal from 
the property. The' majority opinion -does a po-rtioh, of a judgment brings, up for re~ 
not purport to hold that there would have view only that portion designated in the 
been merit in an appeal prosecuted by de- notice of appeal. 2 Cal.Jur. ISS, § 25. 
fendant and cross-complainant if such an While it is true that notices of appeal are 
appeal had been taken. Notwithstanding to be liberally construed with a view to 
this situation, the majority directs the re- hearing cause's on their merits (Harrelson 
versal of the entire judgment so that the v. Miller & Lux, [Inc.], 182 Cal. 408, 414, 
claims of the defendant and cross-com- 188 P. 800), we are of the opinion that the 
plainant set up in her cross-complaint may notice filed in the present case does not 
again be litigated in the trial court. present la mere misdescription' of the judg-
In so holding the majority goes outside 
of the record in suggesting possible rea-
sons why defendant and cross-complainant 
did not appeal, as if her reasons for not 
appealing had any bearing whatever 'upon 
the scope of review of this court on an 
appeal by plaintiff from the portion of the 
judgment against him. Until the decision 
of this court in Hamasaki v. Flotho, 39 
Cal.2d 602, 248 P.2d 910, it was the settled 
rule that "when an appeal is taken from 
a part of a judgment or order not so in-
timately connected with the remainder 
that a reversal of the part appealed from 
would require a reconsideration of the 
whole case in the court below, an appel-
late court can review only the portion ap-
pealed from. The unaffected parts must 
be deemed final, and can be enforced pend-
ing the appeaL" See 4 Cal.Jur.2d, § 535, 
p. 389. This rule has been followed in 
every case deCided by this court prior to 
the Hamasaki case, supra, and it has never 
been departed from except in the Hamasa· 
ki case. In Glassco v. Et Sereno Country 
Club, Inc., 217 Cal. 90, at page 91, 17 P.2d 
703, the late Chief Justice Waste, speak-
ing for a unanimous court, said: II Pre-
liminarily, it might be said that that por-
tion of the judgment denying the appel-
lants a lien, and which is attacked by the 
plaintiffs in their brief herein, is not prop-
erly a subject of review upon this appeal 
because of the insufficiency of the notice 
of appeal. The notice states that the ap-
peal is 'from so much of the judgment here-
in as denies relief to the plaintiffs against 
the said defendant, Ootilde G. Castruccio 
* * *.' The notice of appeal makes no 
mention of that separate and distinct por-
tion of. the judgment denying plaintiffs a 
ment, calling for the application of said 
rule, but rather presents a situation some· 
what analogous to that presented in Dimi· 
ty v. Dixon, 74 Cal.App. 714, 718, 241 P. 
905, viz. one where the. description of that 
portion of the judgment appealed from is 
so clear and unmistakable as' to preclude a 
description of that portion of the judgment 
denying appellants a lien." The following 
cases fully support the rule that an appel-
late Court has jurisdiction to review the 
portion of the judgment appealed from 
only unless the part appealed from is so 
interwoven and connected with the remain-
der, or so dependent thereon, that the ap· 
peal from a part affects the other parts 
or involves a consideration of the' whole, 
and is really an appeal from the whole 
judgment: Lake v. Superior Court, 187 
Cal. 116, 200 P. 1041; G. Ganahl Lumber 
Co. v. Weinsveig, 168 Cal. 664, 143 P. 
1025; Whalen v. Smith, 163 Cal. 360, 125 
-P. 904; In re Burdick's Estate, 112 Cal. 
387, 44 P. 734; Luck v. Luck, 83 Cal. 574, 
23 P. 1035; Early v. Mannix, IS Cal. 149; 
Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Fisher, 106 
Cal. 224, 39 P. 758. 
It must be remembered that the judg# 
ment denying plaintiff relief was based 
upon his complaint and the evidence offered 
by him in support of the allegations of the 
complaint that he was the owner of the 
property as a result of the deed executed 
by his father and placed in escrow to be 
delivered to plaintiff upon his father's 
death. The judgment denying defendant 
relief was based upon the allegations of 
her cross-complaint that she was the owner 
of the property as the result -of an execu~ 
tion sale under a judgment against plain-
tiff. It seems to me that if this court has 
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the power to review the portion of. the 
judgment against the defendant, it should 
determine on this appeal the validity of 
the execution sale and the conveyances 
under which defendant claims and' then 
reverse the entire judgment with direc-
tions to render judgment' either in favor 
of plaintiff or defendant, thus bringing an 
end to the litigation. However, the ma-
jority does not purport to do this but nev-
ertheless . reverses the : judgment against 
the defendant who did not appeal there-
from and makes no contention that the 
judgment against her was erroneous. 
. Section 938 of the Code of Civil Proce-
dure provides: . '_'Any person aggrieve,d 
'may appeal in the cases prescribed in, this 
title. The party appealing is known a·s'the 
appellant, and the adverse party as' .the 
respondent." (Emphasis added.) It goes 
without saying that pl;:tintiff could 'not have 
appe'aled from the portion of the judg-
ment against the defendant, since he was 
not aggrieved thereby, and defendant could 
not have appealed from the portion of .the 
judgment against plaintiff for the same 
reason. The~eforeJ plail1tiff appealed from 
the only portion of the judgment from 
which he could lawfully appeal. 
Section 956 of the Code of Civil Proce-
dure which covers the matters which may 
be reviewed on appeal from a judgment 
concludes with the following sentence: 
~(The provisions of this section do not au-
thorize the court to review any decision or 
order from which an appeal might have 
been taken." The clear implication of this 
provision is that the Court may not review 
any decisions or order from which an ap-
peal might have been but was not taken. 
Applying this provision to the case at bar 
it seems clear that this court is not author-
ized to review, the jUdgment against de-
fen,dant from which no appeal was taken. 
. To :summarize, it appears that the,plain-
tiff appealed from the portion of the judg-
. ment denying the relief demanded by him 
'in his complaint. The majority opinion 
holds that his appeal is meritorious. The 
relief demanded by defendant was by way 
of cross-complaint and the judgment denied 
her such rdief. She did not appeal. It is 
conceded that her claim of title is based 
upon instruments entirely separate and 
apart from the instruments on which plain-
tiff's claim of title is based. Defendant 
has not sought to have this court review 
the portion of the judgment denying her 
relief on her cross-complaint. It is obvious 
that the portion of the judgment denying 
her relief on her cross-complaint is in no 
wise related to the portion of the judg-
ment denying plaintiff the relief deman,ded 
in his complaint. There is no interdepend-
ence between the two portions of the judg-
ment. Such being the case, it is clear un-
der both the code provisions relating to re-
view on appeal an'd the authorities which 
I have cited above' that the' review her'e 
should be limited to the portion of the judg-
. ment from which plaintiff appealed, and 
that the judgment agai~si defendant from 
which no appeal was taken sh€luld riot be 
reviewed. 
As stated earlier in this opinion the orily 
case holding to the contrary' is -Hamasaki v. 
Flotho, supra. The decision in that case 
was based upon the theory advanced by the 
majority that even though there was no ap-
peal from the judgment and only an ap-
peal from an order granting a limited new 
trial, this court had the power to review the 
judgment because it felt required to do so 
uin the interests of justice." There- was no 
question of any interdependence in the 
Hamasaki case as there was only one judg-
ment and one 'order, both of which were in 
favor of the respondent. The majority 
now rely upon the Hamasaki case as au-
thority for reversing the judgment agamst 
defendant in the case at bar from which no 
appeal has been taken. Certainly the Ha-
masaki case is not authority for the holding 
in this case. The other cases relied upon by 
the majority clearly fall within the excep-
tion to the rule that where the part of the 
judgment appealed from is so interwoven 
and connected with the remainder, or so 
dependent thereon, that the appeal from a 
part affects the other parts or involves a 
consideration of the whole, that it is really 
. an appeal from the whole judgment. The 
case at bar' ,does not fall within this rule 
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as clearly appears from what I have here- stated that "Justice is what is well es-
tofore stated. tablished" and that "Justice is compliance 
It should be noted that the foregoing rule 
relates only to judgments which are not 
divisible into separate parts. lAnd in order 
for the rule to be -applicable, the judgment, 
on its face, must disc1os'e that the part ap-
pealed from is interwoven with Of depend-
ent upon other parts not appealed from. 
In other words, unless the interdependenc'e 
of the separate parts of the judgment ap-
pears upon the face of the judgment itsel£ 
there can be no basis for holding that the 
part appealed from is so interwoven and 
connected with the remainder, or so de-
pendent thereon, that the appeal from a 
part affects the other parts or involves a 
oonsideration of the whole judgment. 
Since the judgment in the case, at bar is in 
twq s.eparate and distinct parts or para-
graphs_ and neither makes any reference to 
the ,other, there is no basis whatever for a 
holding that they are in any way interwoven 
with or de'p'endent upon each other. 
The effect of the majority holding in this 
case is not only to 'create confusion in the 
law, as it undoubtedly will, hut it places an 
additionallburden on both appellate and trial 
courts to review portions of judgments 
from which no appeal is taken. in clear vio-
lation of the statutory provisions which I 
have heretofore cited. The right of ap-
peal is clearly statutory as well as the scope 
of review. The Legislature has sought to 
limit the power of appellate co'urts 'to re-
view only such portions of judgments as 
may be appealed from. This legislation 
has a dual purpose. First, to reduce the 
amount of work required by an appellate 
'court in disposing of an appeal, and second, 
to limit the issues which' may be retried in 
the trial court in the event of a reversal 
which should have the effect of saving the 
time of both the trial court and litigants. 
It now appears that the majority of this 
court not only ignores this salutary legisla-
tion but overrules the long line of authori-
ties upholding and applying such legisla-
tion without even mentioning either the 
legislation or, the authorities. The majority 
claims the right to do this "in the 'interests 
of justice." However, it, has been aptly 
wi,th the written laws." I find no basis 
for the holding of the majority in this case 
in any concept of justice with-which I am 
familiar. 
SCHAUER, 'Justice. 
I dissent. It is rp,y view that the dissent-
ing opinion of Mr. Justice McComb of the 
District Court of Appeal, Second District, 
Division Two (Osborn v. Osborn (1953; 
Cal.App.), 256 P.2d 653, 657), correctly dis-
poses of the legal issues presented by the 
undisputed fads alleged; proved, and found 
in this case. I shall state the facts in some-
what greater detail than they are stated by 
Justice McComb in order that I may here-
inafter point out those :facts which, in my 
opinion, have caused the majority of this 
court to announce an erroneous view of 
the applicable law. 
In order to compromise a dispute as to 
who was entitled to the property of Chloie 
I. Osborn, deceased mother of plaintiff 
Merinoeth and wife of Thomas D. Osborn, 
plaintiff and Thomas on June 27, 1939, 
executed a contract entitled "Stipulation." 
The ,validity of this contract is not ques-
tioned. On July 21, 1939, such contract 
was filed in the proceeding for probate of 
the estate of Chloie 1. Osborn. It provides 
in material part that the probate court 
may set aside disputed real property (Lot 
97) to Thomas as having been the home-
stead of Thomas and -Chloie; that Thomas 
"will execute either by deed, contract or 
declaration of trust, sufficient documents, 
conveyances or declarations so that * * 
Lot 97 * * • will be retained in the 
name of' Thomas D. Oshorn, during his 
lifetime and that the same should vest in 
his Son Merinoeth R. Osborn at the time of 
the demise of the said Thomas '* *. * 
[A]ll income on the properly will go to 
and belong to Thomas D. Osborn during 
his lifetime and out of the said sum of 
monies received, he will .pay all ordinary 
and usual expenses, such as, maintenance, 
taxes, repair and ordinary improvements 
due to wear and tear. Any surplus from 
said amounts ·shall belong to Thomas * *. 
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This Stipulation shall be binding upon the 
h-eirs, executors, administrators and assigns 
of the parties hereto." 
Pursuant to this agreement the probate 
court on July 21, 1939, determined that Lot 
97 had been the homestead of Thomas and 
Chloie and set it aside to Thomas as his 
separate property. 
On July 7, 1939, Thomas signed a grant 
deed of Lot 97 to plaintiff Merinoeth, "re~ 
serving to the grantor the exclusive posses-
,sian and the use and enjoyment in his own 
right of the rents, issues and profits 'of 
said property * * * during the term of 
his natural life. This deed is executed in 
accordance with the terms and conditions of 
that certain trust agreement of July 7th, 
1939, * * * and is subject to all con-
ditions, exceptions and reservations as in 
said trust agreement provided." 
The "trust agreement" of July 7- provides 
'(hat "the said deed is to be turned over 
,and delivered to the trustees herein [Fink-
enstein and Warner] to be used, delivered 
and held under, the terms and. conditions in 
this agreement set forth"; th~ deed shall 
reserve to Thomas, the grantor, a life 
estate and tIthe right to revoke the deed in 
the event second ·party [Merinoeth] wil-
fully harms grantor, and second party 
reserves the right to cancel this agreement 
if grantor wilfully harms second party"; 
the only powers and duties of the trustees 
are to keep the deed and not record it 
during the life of Thomas and to deliver it 
to Merinoeth only on the death of Thomas, 
and to defend against any attempt by either 
party Uto break the terms of the within trust 
agreement"; Thomas tlagrees to, will any 
and all right, title,' or interest he may have 
in said real property toll Merinoeth j the 
agreement is binding on the heirs, execu-
tors, and assigns of the parties; and "the 
wilful failure or refusal of either party to 
comply with the obligations herein pro-
vided, on his part to be performed, shall 
permit either party to rescind this agree-
ment and shall confer upon the gr.antor the 
right to cancel the within mentioned deed 
and this agreement." 
On January 14, 1946, Merinoeth,' Thomas, 
and the trustees executed an j!agreement 
cancelling _trust agreement." In March,. 
1946, by :iui' exchange of'Ie'tters, the parties 
agreed to rescind the cancellation agree-
'ment. 'These-two agreements were executed 
in the ,course of unsuccessful negotiations, 
'between: Thomas and plaintiff for the pur-
chase by Thomas of plaintiff's interest in 
Lot 97. Evidence of the negotiations and' 
the canceIIation agreements and accom-
panying letters has probative 'value as it 
tends to show that Thomas recognized that. 
.Merinoeth had a valuable remainder in-
terest. 
The opinion of Justice McComb disposes. 
of the issues raised' by the above stated' 
~acts in the following manner: 
uQuestions: First: Did the trial court 
properly decline to quiet title in, the PMcd 
of land iit question in plai'Mifj? 
u Yes. The following rules are here· 
pertinent: 
"(1) An escrow is a written instrument 
or personal property which is delivered to a_ 
third party by the grantor, maker, promisor-
or obligor to be held by the depositary 
until the happening of a designated event 
or the' performance of a designated .con-
dition and then to be delivered to the 
grantee, 'promisee or obligee. (Civ.Code, §' 
1057. See also cited cases in 10 Cal.Jur .. 
[1923] Escrows, § I, n. 2, p. 576.) 
"(2) When a dced is deposited by " 
grantor with a third person to be handed' 
to the grantee on the death of the grantor-
* * * without any intention of a pres-
ent transfer of title, but on the contrary,. 
with the intention of the grantor to reserve 
the right of dominion over the deed and th~ 
right to revoke or recall it there is no· 
effective delivery. * * * (Williams v. 
Kidd [1915], 170 Cal. 631; 637 et seq. [lSI 
P. I, Ann.Cas.1916E, 703].) 
H(3) Plaintiff in a quiet title action mu'st 
depend on the strength of his own title and 
not on the weakness of that of defendant. 
Thus, if he fails to prove title in himself, 
he is not entitled to recover. (Alspach v. 
Landrum [1947], 82 Cal.App.2d 901, 903-
[I] [187 P.2d 130]; Tanner v. Title Ins. & 
Trust Co. [1942], 20 Cal.2d 814, 825 [13} 
[129 P.2d 383].) 
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tc Applying the i~regoing rules to the perform the June 27 agreement. It appears 
·facts in the present case we 'find that under that the June 27 agreement, rather' than the 
'rule (1) the handing of the deed to defend- trust agreement, was binding and enforce-
ants Finkenstein and Warner created an able. And the June 27 agreement has never 
escrow, and since Mr. Osborn reserved the been discharged by' performance or other-
right to revoke or cancel the deed upon the wise. 
happening of certain conditions, there was The majority opinion here appears to be 
no intent to make an unconditional delivery an attempt to give, or to lay the foundation 
:Of the deed. Therefore, it not having been for giving, plaintiff .Merinoeth and the 
delivered to plaintiff prior to his father's nonappealing cross-complainant Louise, a 
<leath, under rule (2) the deed was never remedy akin to quasi-specific enforcement 
-delivered and no title passed to plaintiff. of the June 27 agreement. But that is a 
Hence, under rule (3), plaintiff having remedy which Merinoeth should have 
failed to -prove title in himself the trial court sought against the representatives of the 
properly held that he was not entitled to estate of his deceased father, and Merinoeth 
have title quieted in him. has not seen fit to institute such proceedings 
"Second: Was there substantial evi- and proceed on such a theory, 
dence to sustain the trial court's finding 
that the transaction between the parties did 
1'ot create a trust agreement but merely 
created an escrow? 
"Yes. The transaction falls squarely 
within the definition of an escrow as set 
forth under rule (1) supra. There is a 
total absence of any of the elements of a 
trust agreement. Therefore the court's 
finding is supported by substantial evi ... 
dence." 
The majority herein proceed upon' the 
fallacious premise that "Thomas was bound 
by the terms of the trust agreement, ex~ 
ecuted contemporaneously with the deed, 
not to attempt to recall the deed from the 
possession of the trustees * * *, Thom-
as did not retain control over the deed after 
he delivered it to the trustees. There is 
nothing in the trust agreement, or external 
to it, to indicate that Thomas did not intend 
the transmission of the deed to the trustees 
to be a valid legal delivery," Obviously 
such "finding" by the majority invades the 
province of the trier of fact and draws 
inferences from both the documents and 
the surrounding circumstances contrary to 
those drawn by the tri.al judge. Why was 
an escrow created and conditions for can-
cellation specified if the. deli~ery was un-
.conditional? Furthermore, I cannot agree 
that ,jThomas was ,bound by the terms of 
the trust agreement." The signing by 
"Thomas of the' July 7 trust agreement and 
deed :was, at best, an ineffective attem~t to 
For the reasons above stated I should 
affirm the judgment. 
Rehearing denied i CARTER and 
SCHAUER, JJ., dissenting. 
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DANIELS v. BRIDGES. 
elv. 19825. 
District Court of Appeal, ..second District, 
Division 3, California. 
March 1, 1954. 
Suit for declaratory relief, to estab-
lish a constructive trust and for an injunc-
tion involving right to revoke a joint will. 
From a judgment of the Superior Court, 
Los Angeles County. James M. Allen, J., 
in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff ap-
pealed. The Court of Appeal, Vallee, J., 
held that survivor of husband and wife 
who made a joint will devising property to 
third person after death of both was en-
titled to revoke will; in absence of any con-
tract depriving survivor of right of rev-
ocation . 
Judgment affirmed. 
I. Wills $=>100 
A Ujoint will" is a single testamentary 
instrument constituting or containing the 
